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Abstract 
The tendency to throw controls at perceived and real system vulnerabilities, coupled with the likelihood 
of these controls being technical in nature, has the propensity to favour security over usability. 
However there is little evidence of increased assurance and it could encourage work stoppages or 
deviations that keep honest users from engaging with the system. The conflicting balance of trust and 
controls, and the challenge of turning that balance into clear requirements, creates an environment 
that alienates users and feeds the paranoia of actors who assume more ownership of the system than 
necessary. Security therefore becomes an inhibitor rather than an enabler for the community. This 
paper looks at measuring the balance of an organisation’s or a community’s risk appetite with the risk 
attitudes of its members in the early stages of IS development. It suggests how the dials of assurance 
can be influenced by the levers of good systems practice to create a cultural shift to trusting the users. 
 
Keywords: Security, risk, requirements, trust, non-functional. 
1.0 Introduction 
The importance of secure systems is increasing with the broad range of technological 
advancements within every domain of human society (Dubois and Mouratidis, 2010) 
not least with the developing ubiquity and pervasiveness of the Internet of Things 
(O’Neill, 2014).  As the sophistication of security threats continues to evolve, 
organisations must take steps toward preventing the losses from these threats (John, 
2000). 
 
The increase in technology-driven services is matched by an increasingly diverse 
range of stakeholders in the systems that provide or are involved with those services 
(Alexander, 2007). Security always assumes some degree of trust in its mechanisms 
(Dubois and Mouratidis, 2010). Trust is a state of positive expectation that one’s 
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vulnerabilities will not be exploited (Riegelsberger, Sasse, and McCarthy, 2005). So, 
in an attempt to engender the desired trust, all software-based systems have to 
compensate for an environment over which the law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1957) 
will allow them little control. The various elements that must struggle for the control 
of the system within the environment – stakeholders, users, relevant laws and 
regulations – will influence the security aspects of the system (Islam, Mouratidis, and 
Jürjens, 2011). Security requirements analysis and security-related decision making 
requiring the analysis of personal and organisational goals of the stakeholders 
participating in the system due to the subjective nature of security are important (Elahi 
et al., 2010). The challenge for those who develop or change information systems is 
that stakeholders have conflicting requirements with respect to the assets that 
comprise the system (Fabian et al., 2010). 
 
In this study we have considered: (a) how the vagaries of the risk attitude (Hillson and 
Murray-Webster, 2007) can be translated into programmable security requirements; 
(b) how to balance the security requirements with risk appetite of the organisation as 
represented by the security controls it embraces (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013); and (c) how 
the balance of risk appetite and attitude can be measured and assured. 
 
Systems that trade security for ease of use are likely to be used incorrectly resulting in 
security risk which may include wilful circumvention (Beckles, B et al., 2005). In this 
paper we look at the early stages of development and discuss the good, the bad, and 
the ugly in the problem space of building security into an information system so that it 
does not stand out as a feature whilst the system is in use (Bevan, 1995) and then 
carry this through to test the method with users. We suggest that this practice is a 
critical success factor to enable the usability of a system at its simplest and to 
encourage acceptable use of the system at its best. 
 
If security is implemented well then it will be invisible to the users. However if it is 
implemented badly then security controls are in place but their implementation makes 
for inelegant use of the system, and in the worst case scenario poor consideration of 
security in the realisation of requirements can lead to anguish where users create their 
own workarounds and data migrates to the unintentional information system. 
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We shall suggest that the challenge of articulating security requirements may be met 
by enabling secure systems operation through a framework for user liberation, and 
conclude with an assessment of examples where it would appear that by accident or 
by design, the mechanisms to achieve security objectives through the system in use 
have been successful. 
 
2.0 The problem space: unintentional information systems 
There is a challenge to find those who do not pay sufficient attention to risk and the 
very human nature of losing their sense of emotional literacy in an effort to achieve 
personal goals or just to get the job done (Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007). We 
have articulated this in our research questions (see 1.0 Introduction above). Ignoring 
risk may have no malicious intent but it may have significant consequences well 
beyond the immediate environment of the individual. Even shocks that can trigger 
appropriate emotions at one time may be relatively short lasting. For example, would-
be Liverpool football club spectators who wanted to break into the Champions League 
final against AC Milan (23 May 2007) (McNulty, 2007) where a lack of available 
tickets had led to their exclusion from the ground. The emotions governing their 
desire to see the game overcame their appreciation of what had happened at a match 
between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest when 96 people died after supporters tried 
to enter an already overcrowded stadium (15 April 1989) (BBC News, 2009). The 
challenge is to maintain an awareness of the risks to many when individuals distance 
themselves from the consequences of their actions. Information systems not only need 
to provide opportunity to share and transform information but also need to remind 
users of the outcomes of their actions of using the system. For example, what 
consideration do people give to the consequences of publishing holiday photographs 
or personal information on a ‘Web 2.0’ social network (House of Lords, 2007) and 
how much thought does a user give to continuing e-mail correspondence using the 
‘Reply-to-All’ function? At the other extreme, how many are prevented from making 
decisions or taking actions which would be unlikely to lead to a risk being realised? 
There is a tendency for overcompensating day-to-day; to be become obsessed with the 
high impact, low probability risk. For a comprehensive approach, sensitivity to the 
weltanschauung of each user is required as it could be said that risk is in the eye of the 
beholder. 
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The term ‘unintentional information systems’ was coined by Professor Bob Wood 
(Dresner, 2011) to describe the movement of data from the intended places of 
processing, transit, and storage to places where that data should not be. The data is 
handled by people outside the information system that was designed for it by 
legitimate users who want to do things their way, or by nefarious ‘users’ who have 
their own objectives – the system ‘misuse’ case. 
 
Human factors are still not sufficiently addressed in the process of engineering secure 
software systems (Faily and Flechais, 2010). It is important to ground usability 
decisions in information gathered about real people, potentially including them in the 
design process (ibid.). Security lock-down should not result in security lock out. There 
should be no expectations that the user will apply much thought process to the reasons 
for having to navigate security controls when they stand between a risk – however 
calculated and however likely – and getting a job done. The calamity occurs when the 
workaround damages the workflow resulting in stunted operations or worse – a failure 
to operate. The intentional, designed system is no longer able to protect data and any 
capability in the system for self-preservation (business continuity) is moot. 
 
This work is needed to improve security by default without which there will be active 
failures through both technical and social vulnerabilities (Flechais, Sasse, and Hailes. 
2003) As well as designing for the people who will use them, secure systems also 
need to be designed for the environment they will be used in. Delivering security for 
the user means a balance of human factors with security requirements so that an 
acceptable level of risk is maintained. 
 
3.0 Literature review 
3.1 The challenge of articulating non-functional requirements 
Information system acquisition, development, and maintenance needs to have a 
complete and consistent set of security requirements – within itself and with relation 
to the other requirements for the system (Fabian et al., 2010). 
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Although many factors contribute to information system failures, the concentration 
and emphasis on the early phases of development holds particular significance. Every 
system of consequence needs good requirements (Orr, 2004). Without knowing the 
requirements of customers and users it is difficult to build the right product 
(Kauppinen, 2005) and without good requirements, project risks, such as costs, 
schedules and performance, increase dramatically (Orr, 2004). In spite of many 
research efforts and the development of a range of Requirements Engineering (RE) 
techniques for a system’s functionality, system failures still continue to be attributed 
to, among other factors, requirements issues. 
 
Crosby’s Quality Management Grid (Crosby, 1979) shows the cost of quality, based 
on removing defects. The sooner the defects are removed in the life cycle, the reduced 
cost of removal, and the increased maturity of the organisation required to achieve 
this. Security flaws may be expressed as quality defects. Security is a non-functional 
requirement or a primary system/software quality characteristic (BS ISO/IEC 25010, 
2011) so information security vulnerabilities and breaches are manifestations of 
quality defects and can therefore be evaluated using Crosby’s grid.  
 
The most challenging projects often involve multiple stakeholders from differing 
organisations, subcontractors, divisions, etc., who may have a diversity of expertise, 
come from different organisational cultures and frequently have competing goals. 
When requirements are based on information gained from users or customers, there is 
a link to project success and a lower proportion of Requirements Engineering in the 
project costs (Kujala et al., 2005). However since people involved in RE processes 
(Alexander, 2007) have various roles (for example, user representative, system 
developer, maintenance staff, financial officer), together with different skills and 
knowledge, each has his or her own understanding of the system to be built or 
changed (Pohl, 1994; Krogstie and Solvberg, 2003). And there is a risk of losing sight 
of the security requirements when an incomplete set of users are consulted (Carr, 
Konda et al., 1993). 
 
Typically requirements stem from two main sources, namely user-defined - usage 
world – and domain-imposed – subject world (Jarke and Pohl, 1993; Rolland and 
Prakash, 2000).  
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Security requirements are consequences of threats to the system (Fabian et al., 2010). 
A threat is posed by someone – who may be a counter-stakeholder – or something that 
threatens something that stakeholder values (ibid). Conflicting stakeholder views 
introduce the challenge of conflicting requirements. All views must be considered to 
synthesise a consistent set of system requirements. A process of reconciliation and 
compromise is needed to effect this to a level of acceptable risk to all stakeholders and 
ultimately the system owner. 
 
The user can be locked out by security, either literally or psychologically. This can 
result in stunted operations and system operational failure. This threatens the ability to 
protect data and the ability for self-preservation in a state of business continuity. 
However security risk countermeasures are necessary to allow an information system 
to protect, operate and self-preserve. Therefore human factors need to be balanced 
with security requirements. We shall show how the barometer of success can be 
shown in a heat map (see Figure 3). 
 
People who specify requirements for products or services that store and process 
information may find that the association of certain words can either inhibit or enable 
specifications that require interpretation to move from intention to realisation. Stating 
that an information system must be, for example, ‘secure’ may result in the 
implementation of hardware, software, and processes which restrict access to such an 
extent that users – with no malicious intention – work around the security constraints 
and inject information into unintentional information systems or, conversely fail to 
realise the possible protection with safe outcomes. Security is a state. It is affected by 
the realisation of risks to that state. Management of risk in the context of information 
security and cyber security is attributed to the application of controls which may vary 
from anywhere between 4 or 35 (Australia, 2012) and 20 critical controls (SANS, 
2013) to 135 (ISO/IEC 27002) and many more (NIST 2013, HIPAA 1996, PCI DSS 
2010). The standards that set out these controls do little to separate out clear risk 
management processes and the feedback they require to adjust the state of security 
within acceptable boundaries that match risk appetite. A requirements specification is 
challenged with being detailed enough to represent complexity whilst being simple 
enough to be unambiguous and understandable and not attenuating the description of 
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the information system it models. It risks (sic!) creating requirements for controls 
whose combined complexity dampens the ability to manage quality attributes such as 
security. 
 
The challenge is how much can we dare to tamper with the constraint of security locks 
to free the user and how do we turn the security controls into non-functional 
requirements meeting obligations of protection and system objectives simultaneously. 
This is the risk and requirements conundrum that we address in this paper. We do this 
by proposing a framework (Figure 2) for user liberation that may reduce the risk of 
security incidents and increase the risk of successful operations. The term ‘risk’ is 
used to mean both negative and positive possibilities throughout this paper to divorce 
the usual association where risk management is defined in terms of negative 
connotations. 
 
3.2 Security: the good, the bad and the ugly 
Poor security has been said to be worse than no security (Townsend, 2000) because it 
is false security. However, we propose that at least some security is better than none 
providing that it doesn’t eschew reliance. 
 
Any measure of security is transient and requires periodic – if not frequent – re-
evaluation. The information that users are provided with needs to be understandable. 
The temptation to label users as ‘the weakest link’ (Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich 
2001) should not lead to a belief that user education will be a panacea (Ranum, 2005). 
It should however be used to suggest that careful elicitation of user-oriented 
requirements may be applied to treat the risks from the detected human 
vulnerabilities. These treatments may include user education but only from the 
perspective that any education will only be effective if users believe in the risk (Sasse, 
2003), and cost effective, secure systems design (Flechais, Sasse, and Hailes, 2003) 
which sets policies and targets to assure risk management within the context of the 
software in use (the policies and targets being the regulators of the protection of 
information in the system). The software needs to believe in the risk on behalf of the 
users. Reworking the software will be desirable but is unlikely to have the speed of 
return that is needed – standards beyond those for good development practices will be 
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required, as well as enticing the implementation of the good practices which are 
already known. 
 
The obligation is on the system designers to develop systems that enable the 
fulfilment of objectives. Security controls need to be unobtrusive to the honest user 
but not to those that would seek to damage the system. 
 
3.3 Quality and security engineering in software 
Although there are a number of security Requirements Engineering methods few take 
into consideration different stakeholder views, attitudes or appetites to risk. Such 
methods include Security Quality Requirements Engineering Methodology 
(SQUARE) (Mead et al., 2005); KAOS (van Lamsweerde, 2007); Secure Tropos 
(Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007; Masscci and Zannone, 2006); Secure i* (Liu, Yu and 
Mylopoulos, 2003); Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis (MSRA) (Gurses, 
Berendt and Santen, 2006). MSRA also proposes steps to address the issue of 
contradictory security concerns amongst stakeholders where compromises must be 
made. However MSRA does not cover threats. UML based approaches such as 
Misuse Cases, Secure UML and UMLsec do not take environmental issues into 
account. Misuse cases allow early focus on security by describing security threats and 
then requirements without going into design (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005). Alexander 
(2002) used misuse cases to successfully determine threats and requirements and 
subsequent resolution of design conflicts. And Breivik (2002) used misuse cases to 
represent security threats from the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP, 
2001) in pattern form. However Misuse cases are not equally suitable for all kinds of 
threats and they could lead to analysis paralysis due to weak method guidelines. 
 
Security requirements were able to be leveraged successfully with usability and cost 
constraints taken into consideration within SECUR, an RFID-based off-site data 
storage management system that significantly improves the security of the backup 
data life cycle (Lopez-Carmona et al., 2010). This was achieved through arranging 
security controls in a set of ten security tiers, of which the level of security increases 
with high level tiers. Houmb et al (2010) applied the SecReq approach to elicit 
security requirements for Internet Protocol Television (IPTV). SecReq, a security 
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standard ISO 14508 Common Criteria driven security requirements elicitation and 
tracing approach, that also uses a heuristics requirements editor and UMLsec. This 
made it possible to gain repeatable feedback from core stakeholders throughout the 
requirements elicitation process. 
 
Elahi et al (2010) proposed a requirements engineering framework to support the 
elicitation of security requirements based on the effects of vulnerabilities on security 
requirements. However the framework assumes knowledge of vulnerabilities , 
potential attacks and countermeasures or that they can obtain such information. 
 
4.0 Designing successful security requirements 
Security is a non-functional requirement of an information system (BS ISO/IEC 
25010, 2011) that must be as clearly defined as the colours, (data-formatting for 
example) that are usually associated with other quality attributes, such as usability or 
interoperability. However, words associated with the specification of security are so 
riddled with their own semiotic baggage that they are either used inappropriately, too 
often, too little, or not at all. Words such as ‘control’, ‘restrict’, ‘legal’, or even ‘risk’ 
suggest the red terminology of protection or danger and suggest barriers to the user. 
 
In the specification of information systems that handle data in a way that is 
commensurate with all reasonable expectations of the impact resulting in compromise 
to their confidentiality, integrity, or availability, we need a method to build 
information systems that can be adapted to the risk literacy of both those who specify 
the information system and those who must apply that specification in development, 
implementation or use. It is the manifestation of the human behaviour principle of IT 
governance (BS ISO/IEC 38500, 2008). This would manifest in a method to support 
the development of secure information systems by reducing the risk of inappropriate 
data processing and increasing the risk of containing the information in an accurate 
state and available where it is genuinely needed. Success is when a requirement is 
identified and the security measures increase the likelihood that requirements will be 
realised and are not by-passed in use. 
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Designing is a necessary activity amongst stakeholders when working towards a 
solution for an information system which is compatible with their needs. Everyone 
designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into 
preferred ones (Simon, 1969).  
 
Design thinking enables the creation of ideas that better meet consumers’ needs and 
desires, rather than making an already developed idea more attractive (Brown, 2008). 
It is also often seen as a way of dealing with complex problems in systems 
development (Saffer, 2005). This enables not only the determination of stakeholders’ 
needs but also the best possible outcome to be ascertained in the balance between 
business impact (CESG, 2009), and end user contentment (Adams and Sasse, 1999). 
 
5.0 A Framework for user security liberation 
5.1 Methodology 
 
The objective of this research was to determine whether the attitudes of individuals to 
risk may be usefully correlated to the acceptable level of risk that is expected by the 
‘risk culture’ in which they work. Knowing this to be true, and how so, is a foundation 
for understanding what training, improved awareness, or other mechanisms - namely 
applying standards as regulators (Beer, 1993) or controls - are needed for changes in 
risk culture or to maintain a current, appropriate risk culture. This was to be tested by 
creating a scale of measurement for attitudes to risk. A questionnaire was constructed 
to determine where on the scale a user should be placed and whether they sit within, 
or outside, the attitude that is acceptable to the owner of the network. The creation and 
refinement of the questionnaire and the evaluation of the responses determines the 
application of the method as a practical tool to evaluate the appropriateness of 
implemented policies (or standards) for risk management in information systems. 
 
5.2 Profiling the user 
The methodology complements the technical and quasi-technical countermeasures 
deployed for use against well-known outsider threats such as hackers or the malicious 
software of criminal programmers. Technical measures would include intrusion 
detection and prevention systems, antivirus or spyware detection and removal 
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programs and firewalls (both hardware and software). Quasi-technical measures 
comprise a technical implementation which may, for example, use technology to 
distract a criminal from gaining inappropriate access to a computer network such as a 
honeypot which may imitate a legitimate network or part of a network with otherwise 
redundant information stored thereon. The common characteristics were isolated and 
are represented by the formula in Figure 1 which is explained below: 
 
System 
Vulnerability at 
the point of use 
= Environmental circumstances + Personal 
circumstance + Path(s) + ICT literacy 
+ Risk literacy + Emotional literacy 
Where 
Risk Literacy = Knowledge of risk + Knowledge of treatment 
+ Willingness to deploy treatment 
Figure 1. Profiling the user in an information system 
The context in which a type of person or organisational role is assessed for being a 
human vulnerability has the two aspects of environmental circumstances of where 
they use information systems (often a workplace), and a set of personal circumstances 
or profile. The environmental circumstances were considered in the questions (and the 
rules designed to evaluate the results) by taking into account the environment and 
context in which an individual is operating. The method recognises that where a user 
engages with a network, the context of use will depend on the profile of the user in 
terms of their ICT skills, the tasks that the user expects, or is expected, to achieve, the 
equipment such as hardware or software that gives the user access, the physical and 
social environments in which engagement takes place, and the stability of the 
organisation in terms of its existence or propensity for change. For example, 
appropriate risk taking for a private individual accessing personal e-mail with a 
mobile device is not likely to be appropriate for another user engaging with a network 
managing a safety-critical SCADA system. However, common areas that would 
secure the use of both would appear in the attitude tests for all users. 
 
The presence or absence of expected security measures and the propensity for users to 
show emotional intelligence in the face of risk were allocated scores to rank the 
quality of the security controls and the reaction to everyday threats. This created a 
- 12 - 
weighted ranking method that allowed quantitative representation of essentially 
qualitative measures. Part of the inherent challenge of collecting information for this 
type of analysis is in the accuracy of the responses and hence the quality of 
information collected. Table 1. Options for investigation, shows how segregating the 
respondents considered the quality of information by providing some independent 
judgement. This table considers who can offer the best answers to questions about the 
organisation with the research objective of eliminating bias in the responses. This 
control is centred on having someone profile the respondent to the questionnaire first. 
This improves quality of the analysis of the responses based on the assumptions (that 
is, acceptable risk) that the supervisor and the individual will not collude, or that the 
response should not be an opportunity to transfer risk from supervisor to individual. 
Again, quality assurance would expect the supervisor to undergo the same scrutiny 
(Quis custodiet ipsos custodes – Who will keep watch over the guardians?). 
O
p
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n
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Questions answered by: Relative 
quality of 
data 
expected 
1 = low 
5 = high. 
(a) Questions about 
the Organisation 
(b) Questions 
about general 
network users/ 
stakeholders 
(c) Questions 
about specific 
individual(s) 
1 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk 
officer 
N/A 2 
2 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
N/A 
Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
3 
3 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
N/A Specific individual 4 
4 Supervisor/ 
Security or Risk officer 
N/A 
Profile information by 
the Supervisor, Security 
or Risk officer; Purely 
risk attitude questions by 
the specific individual 
5 
Table 1. Options for investigation 
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5.3 The liberating route map 
Figure 1 shows the proposed User Liberation Framework. This framework comprises 
the key components of a process to elicit and manage the security requirements that 
can be reflected in a system’s security controls. These controls would be sensitive to 
the attitude of the users who are responsible for handling information and are to be 
built into the system (Bryant, 2013) to assure the steering of the information with the 
boundaries necessary to achieve the business objectives for which the system was 
intended. The organisation’s risk appetite would be assessed using the active security 
control metrics, followed by assessment of individuals’ risk attitude using reactions to 
scenarios relevant to the organisation. A comparison of the risk appetite to risk 
attitude would produce a value to be used in the heat map (Figure 3) and inform 
iterations of security requirements. It is particularly pertinent to consider both 
organisational and stakeholder influences on requirements, as Chmura and Crockett 
(1995) note that when defining functional and non-functional requirements 
individuals often consider only their personal requirements, without thinking about 
the company’s overall goals. 
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Figure 2. User Liberation Framework 
 
Key to all information security management is the understanding of the target of 
protection (BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013) and if not already know, the entry point for the 
framework is asset discovery to enable considered and appropriate controls to be 
selected rather than creating overly complex control matrices to protect items that are 
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no longer important or do not exist. The axes on the heat map are created by 
establishing as series of questions that establish the relative measure of the 
organisations attitude to risk (Y axis) as benchmarked by the degree to which the 
organisation has adopted identified controls from the risk-based information security 
standard ISO/IEC 27001. This is plotted against a weighted ranking of an individual’s 
attitude to risk (X axis). So, questions are asked to discover (for example) whether 
information risk is regularly addressed in projects, operations/IT service delivery, and 
at board level, whether staff may use their own IT equipment for business use (PCs, 
telephones, PDAs, USB sticks/pen drives). These questions are designed to paint a 
risk landscape to understand if the environment that the users are to be found in 
expose day-to-day, system agnostic risk and does something to protect against the 
losses that may be caused by their realisation. The stability of the organisation is itself 
scrutinised with consideration of whether it is undergoing, likely to undergo, or may 
be rumoured to be undergoing some merger or acquisition or internal reorganisation. 
Questions look at practices such as the place of screening staff screened for 
background, qualifications, during selection and during changes of employment and 
their access to information tailored accordingly. This considers the arrangements that 
change unskilled users to skilled individuals who may be expected to manage some 
risk as an instinctive reaction. This is balanced with the question as to whether staff 
have their work monitored for accuracy for a period until competency through 
experience is assured or other validation mechanism is deemed sufficient. The effect 
of the user on the reference architecture is considered by asking if alterations to how 
company equipment is set up can only be done through qualified staff. 
 
The richness of the security environment is weighted by the answer format which 
ranks answers as describing a better quality of environment for working securely on 
the assumption that the best security control is not only implemented but that it should 
also be documented, communicated, and audited. The worst case is where there is no 
policy to say whether a control is used or not. 
 
Attitudes to risk are measured by a similar system of representing responses as to the 
level of concern that the interviewee shows for good and bad information security 
practices – a combination of risk and emotional literacy. Whether or not the user tends 
towards the high-risk profile is analysed by whether they feel threatened, unfamiliar, 
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uncommitted to, or comfortable with the risk and/or the risk treatment that is present 
or applied respectively.  
 
Figure 3. Heat map for showing a balance of human factors with security controls 
 
In the ideal zone (Figure 3) - with low attitude to risk and low appetite for risk 
values - there is a good balance of implemented and audited security policy with staff 
attitudes. A low attitude to risk and high appetite for risk may mean that an 
organisation with weak security may rely on its staff to protect itself from risk. In 
contrast a high attitude to risk and low appetite to risk indicates that the organisation 
is wholly reliant on enforced security policy to protect itself from risk. And a high 
attitude to risk and high appetite for risk indicates that an organisation with weak 
security cannot rely on its staff to protect itself from risk. 
 
5.4 Utility – deriving requirements from the framework 
The heat map is the pivotal tool for deriving requirements that should be built in to the 
system – as determined by the Trustworthy Software Framework, (Bryant, 2013). It 
has been designed to recognise that attitudes are harder to change than security policy 
and so it can be experimented with to adjust the controls of the system (ISO/IEC 
27001 and ISO/IEC 27002, 2013) to bring the information systems plotted exposure 
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to risk into an acceptable zone on the heat map. The controls can be defined as system 
requirements and managed through the acquisition process. 
 
The more sensitive problem of the attitude of the user can be tackled by awareness 
education which can be benchmarked for progress using the attitude questions that are 
used to plot the people component of the heat map. 
 
This was tested by investigating the development environment of  the IT department 
of a County Constabulary. The department comprises system designers, 
implementers, support and maintenance staff, and management and administration. 
The department is responsible systems that handling information classified to 
Business Impact Level 3 (defined as confidential according to HMG Infosec Standard 
No. 1, CESG, 2009). The education programme that offered the opportunity to 
validate the security awareness benchmarking was requested by the organisation’s 
information security officer so that he could discharge its obligations under 
government requirements for mandatory information assurance training. Information 
assurance is defined by CESG as ‘the confidence that information systems will protect 
the information they carry and will function as they need to, when they need to, under 
the control of legitimate users’. The training was designed specifically for the IT 
department. This realised the responsibility of system developers to manage 
requirements and create systems where usability would not be compromised by the 
poor design of the security controls (Flechais, Sasse, Hailes, 2003). Each session 
comprised a presentation with an exercise to test the risk awareness of the staff. It is 
worthwhile noting that the IT department agreed to the training under sufferance as it 
was not seen to be a priority. 
 
In several training sessions the questions measuring risk attitude were completed at 
the start and end of the session and benchmarked against the original answers. The 
results were used to see if the training had improved the attitude of those attending by 
increasing their awareness of risk and what was considered as acceptable treatments 
for those risks. 
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The IT department comprised 83 staff who were involved with the development, 
support, and maintenance of information and communication systems for the 
organisation, and administrative support for the department. The staff attended the 
training sessions in groups of 12 or less with little or no knowledge of why they were 
required to attend. Each session started with an explanation followed by a review of 
their information security attitude. This was taken with the risk appetite measure for 
the organisation which had been calculated by interviewing the information security 
officer using the questions about the organisation’s status, and the content and quality 
of deployment of the organisation’s information risk management policies. His 
responses were added to the spreadsheet, leaving the questions about the local attitude 
to risk to be asked during training sessions with the IT department. This plot was 
made with the version of the questions used by the in-depth questionnaire so that the 
trainees could not only see where they were placed in relation to themselves before 
and after the training but also with respect to other organisations. An example from 
one session is shown in Figure 4. The objective was to show the collective risk 
attitude of each group. 
 
The training session for each group contained material to educate attendees in the 
basics of information assurance, teach them how to apply proportionate treatments to 
information risk, and help them appreciate the stakeholders who will make risk 
treatment effective. This was exercised with a fictional case study about handling 
sensitive information to which the controls of BS ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) had to be 
applied to link risks with policies and countermeasures. 
 
5.5 Measuring the attitude of the user 
Seven sessions were run which included most of the department in the training. As the 
programme was run, it became more and more challenging to deliver the sessions 
with some of those attending being distracted by their perception that the training was 
a low priority in relation to their day-to-day responsibilities. Priority was given to 
delivering the presentation material and encouraging participation in discussion and 
the risk treatment exercise. Only three of the seven sessions completed the 
benchmarking exercise. The results are shown in Table 2. 
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Appetite 
Score 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
Attitude 
Score 
Appetite 
Score 
Attitude 
Score 
Training session: first measure 301 324 486 287 
Central Government 424 1698 1698 1698 
Construction 396 861 861 861 
Law 426 1797 1797 1797 
Registered Social Landlord 442 1854 1854 1854 
Local Government 434 886 886 886 
Insurance 675 752 752 752 
Education 432 803 803 803 
Software 613 694 694 694 
Utilities 463 886 886 886 
Gambling 460 848 848 848 
Local Government 512 800 800 800 
Charity 403 800 800 800 
Healthcare 473 925 925 925 
Training session: second measure 301 209 137 137 
Table 2. Before and after training – measures of risk attitude 
5.6 Analysis of the results 
In all sessions, the coordinates of the group under scrutiny were moved further into 
the heart of the green zone of the chart. Figure 4 shows the improvement measured 
from the first session. It is worth noting that the organisation scored well from the 
outset with regard to both risk appetite and risk attitude. This is likely to be because of 
the nature of the organisation’s work which require it to habitually regard security as 
important as part of its business which often requires it to enforce security for others. 
This is further exemplified by the existence of the full time information security 
officer and the mandate for the information security awareness training. 
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Figure 4. Improvement in risk and treatment awareness measured in the first session of training 
 
6.0 Conclusions and future work 
There is a clear need for a solid foundation to be established for information systems 
development, as an important detail missed at an early stage can lead to large 
problems later in development. The User Liberation Framework (Figure 2) presented 
in this paper focuses on the early stages of IS development and attempts to measure 
the balance of an organisation or community’s risk appetite with the risk attitudes of 
its members.  
 
Research tends to concentrate on what is required in terms of system security from an 
organisational perspective rather than focusing on the human usability aspect, 
showing the causal links between security breaches and people’s behaviour and the 
system. There also tends to be a gap between organisational expectations and user 
actions and technical capabilities. For example research by Mannan and van Oorschot, 
(2007) highlighted the emerging gap between banks’ expectations and users’ actions 
related to security requirements of online banking. 
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In this study we have shown: the opportunity provided by modelling the human 
vulnerabilities in information systems to synthesise programmable security 
requirements (a), how the realisation of those requirements can be used to check the 
balance of security requirements with risk appetite of the organisation as represented 
by the security controls it embraces (b), and how the balance of risk appetite and 
attitude can be measured and assured by representing them on a heat map (c). 
 
Supporting research around the language of risk is still needed to support the 
promulgation of a tool for detecting human vulnerabilities in information systems. 
Are the terms risk attitude and risk appetite sufficiently defined and understood? How 
does one describe appetite which may vary from one organisation to another, yet be 
good enough for each depending on the risk treatments deployed and the respective 
residual risk that remains? Some of this is addressed in the model for connecting 
organisations with a standards-based approach (Dresner and Wood, 2007). The term 
good is used here to describe individuals who appreciate their responsibilities to 
manage a degree of risk and whose awareness encompasses the organisational 
measures in place to allow risk-managed access to the information system. 
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